## Approved FULL STATE CTA-RDP62S00346A000100030011-2

THE DIAMOND INJUSTRY IN THE USON June 1958

Since 1956, the USSA has been speaking in glowing terms of the discovery of dismond deposits in Yakutiya, northeast of lake Saikal in Eastern Siberia. According to Soviet claims, several dozen or more kimberlite pipes\* have been discovered as well as a large number of placer deposits. Many of these placer deposits are being worked at the present time but setual output has not been announced. The majority of dismonds being recovered at present are of the industrial variety of which bort constitutes a fairly large part; gem grade stones account for only a small percentage. Information on the quantity of the more essential types of industrial dismonds such as tool stones, hardness testers, and die stones, has not been reported. The degree of self-sufficiency of the USSA in industrial diamonds from the lakutiya fields will depend on the quantities of these essential types recovered.

Little has been said about reserves in quantitative terms. Claims have been limited to statements that reserves amount to millions of carata and are enough to satisfy Soviet requirements. It has also been stated that the supply will be sufficient to increase by many times the use of diamonds in industry. This suggests that as diamonds become available from domestic sources the Soviet Union will increase its consumption to conform more closely to the level of other nightly industrialised nations. Swidence suggests that Soviet consumption has never approached this level.

ACMIDITAL IAL

<sup>\*</sup> A pipe is a vertical, cylindrical mass of volcanic agglemerate.
Kimberlite is a volcanic rock which may contain dissonds.

while placer deposits may be capable of supplying large quantities of diamonds for some years, the future of the Sowiet diamond industry will depend upon the diamond content of the kimberlite pipes. The contents of the pipes, only the upper or near surfaces of which probably have been investigated thus far, are reported as ranging from h er more carets per ten of ore in some pipes—an average comparable to many African producers—to only .05 to .08 carets per ten in others.

The tremendous investment that apparently has been made in Yakutiya, including that for both prospecting and preparations for actual mining, indicates the sincerity of the Soviet belief in this area as a source of industrial diamonds. The more enthusiastic claims, however —such as those indicating that Yakutian deposits are more valuable than those of africa—should be viewed with reservation until the book presents more concrete evidence as to its self-sufficiency.

The Soviet publication <u>Veprosy Ekonomiki</u> So. 6, 1957 stated that a highly industrialized nation such as the SS consumes one cerat of industrial diamonds per 10 tens of crude steel output and that on this basis the USSE would require 6,000,000 carats of industrial stones in 1960. It is doubtful, however, that the factor of 1 carat per 10 tens of crude steel is valid for the USSE. Soviet steel products are seldom finished to the degree they are in the US, and since Soviet manufacturers apparently are not as concerned with the product's appearance as SS manufacturers, there would be little incentive for the USSE to

change its practice in this respect. A second factor which will tend to keep dissend requirements lower than US requirements, is that the USSR has developed substitutes, many of which are apparently quite efficient. It is questionable whether these would be completely abandoned unless a plantiful supply of dissends were assured almost indefinitely.

An estimate of soviet requirements at one-half those of the US or one caret per 20 tons of cruis steel output soums reasonable in light of these conditions. Assuming this ratio is roughly correct Soviet requirements would be as follows: 1957, 2,550,000 carets; 1960, 2,990,000 carets; and 1965, 4,000,000 carets.

sources of supply for its industrial diamond requirements. Insection as the major diamond producing countries, with the exception of Shaue, are mashers of COCOK which has embargoed diamond sales to the Bloc and because the Mismond Trust also has forbidden its members to sell to the Sowiets, the Cocok's diamond supply is primarily from illicit sources. Simmonds have been imported through illicit channels from the traditional diamond processing countries - Selgium, the Matherlands, and Switzerland - as well as from the Mirican sources of South Africa, the Belgian Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Jhans, and Southern Rhodesia. Many of these imports were by way of Liberla and certain Middle East countries. Small amounts may also have been obtained from South American, particularly from Brazil.

The dissend fields of Sierra Leone are probably even more important than South Africa or the Belgian Congo as a source of supply for the USSA.

COMPINENTIAL

despite concentrated afforts by the government to curtail their operations. The output from these illicit operations has been reported to equal the output from these illicit operations has been reported to equal the output from these illicit operations. This suggests that a total of from 600,000 to 900,000 carets (60% to 66% of which are reported to be industrials) may be finding their way into illicit channels each year. The government's official estimate of the value of stones being snuggled is \$ 4,000,000 a year; other sources estimate it to be as high as \$ 13,000,000 a year. In view of the high prices reportedly being offered by the USER for industrial stones—from two to three times would market prices—it is not unlikely that a large part of these diamonds were obtained eventually by the USER.

. .>

Another source of supply for the USSE has been in the form of diamond tools. Diamond drill bits, for instance, were reported to have been sold to the USSE by Sweden and it is not unlikely that some smaggling has taken place. Quantities, however, were apparently not enough to satisfy demand; reports emanating from the USSE have referred specifically to diamond tools and to bits as items in short supply. The extent of smaggling or unreported sales of such tools is very difficult to assess and their contribution to Soviet requirements cannot be evaluated with the information now available.

COMEINENTIAL

H-DDD00000464000400000044